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F/ACTUAL KNOWING 
PUTTING FACTS AND VALUES IN PLACE 
HOLMES ROLSTON III 
Knowing needs to be actualized, an act of ours, yet also a discovery 
of what is actually, factually there. In place ourselves, we manage some 
awareness of other places. Agents in our knowing, we co-respond, and 
this emplaces us. But we humans have powers of dis-placement too, of 
taking up, whether empathetically or objectively., the situations of others, 
other humans, sometimes others than humans. How do our facts depend 
on our acts? Do we humans always put in place, or sometimes find put, 
placed there before us, what we variously value on Earth? 
To put this provocatively: We need to "green" our beliefs; but every 
educated person knows that nothing out there is really "green." "Seeing 
green" is an interaction experience. Perhaps this perceptual experience is a 
model for the whole: all of our human concepts and percepts color up 
the world. This is true alike of facts and of values, discoveries and evalu-
ations. Such knowing might be well enough placed, but it is always and 
only "placed." Our geographical position controls our epistemic compo-
sition. Epistemology is inevitably anthropocentric; we are always located 
in the center of our knowing. 
But what if the "green" we see is mostly chlorophyll? Photosynthesis 
is not something we can see at all. In place on Earth, we humans breathe 
oxygen and would die in minutes without it; we depend on photosynthe-
sis at the foundation of our food chains. We know our own respiratory 
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and trophic interactions with the plants, and this not simply at the native 
range experiences of breathing and eating. We have figured out the oxy- 
gen/carbon-dioxide/water cycles taking place at molecular levels. 
Now it seems, however, that we are discovering ourselves placed 
where the facts are bigger than our acts, including our respiratory (and 
perceptual) interactions; these extend systemically and are hardly anthro- 
pocentric. Epistemologically, we have more to evaluate. "Greening" our 
belief, environmentally grounding it, will require knowing and appropri-
ately respecting these vital life processes—of which we are a part, but 
which also are "in place" and "take place" apart from us. 
1. EMBODIED, KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS 
Whatever knowledge we gain has to "come through" at our native 
range. That seems uncontroversial, but what are the implications? Knowl-
edge is relative to our location, our embodiment, our size, our terrestrial 
habitat. This situation constricts, it may be claimed, what can "come 
through." Mark Johnson concludes: "Our consciousness and rationality 
are tied to our bodily orientations and interactions in and with our envi-
ronment. Our embodiment is essential to who we are, to what meaning 
is, and to our ability to draw rational inferences and to be creative." He 
urges us to "put the body back into the mind," that is, epistemologically, 
to become aware of how the body is there, willy-nilly (1987, xxxviii, 
xxxvi). Joining with George Lakoff, he claims: "Reason, even in its most 
abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature" 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4). 
Katherine Hayles continues: "To be incorporated within a different 
body would be to live in a different world." She features "interactivity" 
and explains: 
Interactivity foregrounds rather than obscures the importance of 
embodiment. In the interaction model, the body does more than pro-
vide a biological support system for the mind. Interaction is possible 
only because we are embodied, and the precise conditions of our 
embodiment have everything to do with the nature of those interac-
tions. The range and nature of sensory stimuli available to us, the 
contexts that affect how those sensory stimuli achieve meaning, the 
habituated movements and postures that we learn through culture and 
that are encoded for gender, ethnicity, and class—all affect how learn-
ing takes place and how the world comes into being for us. (1995, 56) 
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All this seems true, if one means that with reincarnation our native 
range experiences would be different. Wolves have keen noses and with 
them they experience, if you like, a different world. But the survival value 
of wolf noses, a situated knowledge for them, is equally true for humans, 
wolves, and elk, because all three live in the same world. That feature of 
"how the world comes into being for us" seems prior to our embodiment 
with our less keen noses, and also something that we have been able to 
figure out anyway. Our skills have discovered another skill that, though 
we do not share it, we can admire. 
Trees, we might say, are organisms incorporated in different bodies, 
without noses; they live in a world of photosynthesis, as do neither 
humans nor wolves. Trees "come into being in the world" differently from 
humans. We do not "experience" photosynthesis, nor do trees. But pho-
tosynthesis is equally true for wolves, humans, and trees. Further, an 
account of what is going on there has come into our experience. If we had 
six legs and wings, or had we been born octopuses, the survival value of 
tree photosynthesis and of wolf noses would not change, though in those 
situations we would be unable to give an analytical account of either. All 
these are embodied forms of being, and the model we want is more plu-
ralist. Earth is a valuable marvel of biodiversity, with richly various forms 
of embodied life. Perhaps we can find others well situated to defend what 
they value, and ourselves situated well enough to appreciate this other-
ness. Will this be on account of, or despite, our particular form of 
embodiment, human personality? Maybe both. We could be cognitively 
competent to study how the world is, yet the world will remain how it 
ontologically is, despite the successes or failures of our epistemology. 
That we are embodied persons is not an unwelcome fact. "Green," for 
example, is no experience we wish to give up or get past. Coloradoans cel-
ebrate the "green and gold" on their landscapes: the spring greens against 
the dark green conifers, or the aspen gold against those conifers in the 
fall. There are many pleasures of the proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
senses—sight, hearing, smell, touch, warmth, somatic awareness. Envi-
ronmental aesthetics stretches all our senses: the curve of the purple 
mountains rising toward the azure sky, the wind howling in the blue 
spruce, the fragrant, pungent odor of the needles, sharp to the touch. We 
go with the flow-experience of the brisk hike. Wait, stop! Listen, loons are 
calling! 
HOLMES ROLSTON III  F/ACTUAL KNOWING      139 
But then again, neither do we want to be so embodied that we are 
unable to appreciate what is outside ourselves, others in their bodies, as 
we are already doing when we stop to listen to the loons. Philosophers 
have perennially found themselves in an epistemic prison. There is no 
human knowing that is not looking out from where we are, using our 
senses and our brains, from an anthropocentric perspective. That may be 
postmodern knowledge; it was already premodern. Remember the tale of 
the blind men and the elephant from India. Loon calls, wolves sniffing 
elk, spruce trees, their photosynthesis—these are known only with our fil-
ters on, the percepts and concepts of our peculiar environment. 
All knowledge is relative; there is no "mirror of nature" (Rorty 
1979). Richard Rorty deplores "the impossible attempt to step outside 
our skins—the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our 
thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something 
absolute." He urges philosophers to suppress the "urge to escape from the 
finitude of one's time and place" (1982, xix). Agreed, we do not want to 
escape the finitude of time and place either. But we do wish, rather, to 
establish the reality of times and places, our own and that of others on 
Earth, and then to evaluate life in its historical, earthy finitude. 
We want to see better into our time and place; but to do that we do 
need to see outside ourselves, not to the "infinite," but at least to the 
global, to the finite myriads of other creatures with whom we share this 
time and place. We perhaps cannot compare our percepts and concepts 
with something "absolute" (that disparaging word of the anti-realists), 
but we can cross-check them with a world on the other side of our skins, 
which we move through, forming cognitions inside ourselves co-respond-
ing with this world encountered outside. We can't get out of our skins; 
but, inside our skins, we do bump into objects in the world in ways that 
give us convincing evidence of their "objectivity"—a concept to which we 
return below. 
We are not so much prisoners encased in our skins as persons incar-
nate on Earth. We have no "infinite" "mirror," reflecting perfectly every 
process and ontological level, quarks to quasars, with ecosystems at 
mid-range. Perhaps we have no "mirrors" at all; that is a bad metaphor, 
used to caricature an epistemology. We encounter some things, and avoid 
others, because we have "windows"—eyes, ears, noses—and brains and 
hands, with which to construct theories and instruments that may enlarge 
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these windows. Maybe we can also become critics of our appearances and 
how veridical they are. 
We do not need a "view from nowhere," but we do need a "view from 
now here." Everybody has a "body," everybody has a "standpoint," a 
"viewpoint." Hopefully, sometimes, we might get well positioned to see 
out? What and how far? Can we critique our own seeing? And knowing? 
Homo sapiens—we have named ourselves; can we get ourselves wised-up 
about what and how we know? 
2. EMBODIED PERSONS IN PLACES 
We are embodied persons in environments of two kinds, nature and 
culture. Life, a skin-in affair, is equally a skin-out event. Human life is a 
mind-in, and mind-out event too, Recent critiques in epistemology have, 
broadly, two components: (1) An ideological component. Our knowledge 
is a function of the ideas we make up, a social construction produced 
interactively in the human communities within which we live. (2) A phys-
iological component. Our knowledge is a somatic construction produced 
interactively on the landscapes on which we reside. Both concepts and 
percepts have classically entered into epistemic analysis, only today the 
challenge is that we do not escape our emplacement in either culture or 
nature as much as enlightened people once believed. 
Ecology is the logic of one's home; ecologists know that no organism 
can step outside its skin. But the central idea of ecology is that skins are 
semi-permeable membranes. No organism can live without constant 
exchanges and transactions across skin. So we do need an ecological epis- 
temology. Humans, though, are at home in social communities. "Man is 
by nature a political animal," said Aristotle (Politics 1,2, 1253). The 
human genus may be animal, but the human differentia or essence is to 
build a polis, a town. The human habitat is village, town, city; human life 
is political, social, or, cultural. 
We protect ourselves quite literally inside our "skin" somatically; but 
if we try to use that metaphorically in epistemological analysis, insisting 
that "we can't get out of our skins," there is an immediate challenge. In 
society we do have language, with which we express our ideas, and these 
do get out of our skins. They get from mind to mouth and out, from mind 
to pen, print, and paper. So ideas cross from one mind to another; skins 
are quite semi-permeable membranes for ideas. 
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Language, we should first say, "comes naturally" to us; we have 
genetic coding, brains, and mouths adapted for speech—the bodily side of 
language. Humans everywhere have language; the child picks up speech 
during normal development with marvelous rapidity. The child-mind is 
innately prepared for such learning. But language, we must go on to say, 
is culturally transmitted. Indeed, such socialized language is what makes 
cumulative transmissible cultures possible. Human language is elevated 
remarkably above anything known in nonhuman nature. The capacities 
for vocabulary development, teaching, symbolization, abstraction, liter-
ary expression, writing, reading, imagination, argument are quite 
advanced. The results do not come naturally as an inheritance from the 
other primates, whatever may otherwise be our genetic or somatic simi-
larity with them. 
Language seems somehow to transform the other bodily capacities, 
such as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, which are shared with animals, 
and to introduce novel capacities in humans, evidenced in descriptions of 
photosynthesis, or debates about environmental justice. We develop 
mathematical and computer languages. Culminating millennia of cultural 
development, we have even built spaceships and flown off the planet to 
take an overview of Earth. Such linguistic capacities may offer a clue why 
this Homo is so sapiens. 
Epistemology is about gaining, using, transferring information. In 
nature these processes are somatic: genetic at molecular, genotypic levels, 
which are expressed in phenotypes, with perceptual facilities. "Informa-
tion" "coded" in genes is, if you insist, a fashion of speaking; it starts in 
analogy from human life, but we also have a quite detailed, reasonably 
objective analysis of how this takes place; this epistemic model is at the 
core of both contemporary genetics and ecology. Organisms "know how" 
to survive in their niches. 
Further, some organisms have sufficient cognitive capacities for 
acquiring information during their lifetimes. These latter acquisitions in 
knowledge, however, do not alter genotypes. In culture, these epistemic 
processes become ideational; and, though minds remain in bodies, ideas 
travel in novel forms. Information in wild nature travels intergenera- 
tionally largely on genes; information in culture travels neurally as a new 
generation is educated into transmissible cultures. The determinants of 
animal and plant behavior are never anthropological, political, economic, 
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technological, scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. That puts us 
in a special situation, especially enabled epistemically. 
We have bodies, we have been told for a quarter of a century, that are 
99% the same as chimpanzees in DNA coding and resulting proteins and 
anatomy (King and Wilson 1975). That figure has recently been revised a 
little, to 95% (Britten 2002). Still, if knowing is such a bodily affair, we 
might compare our bodily knowing with theirs, with chimpanzee episte- 
mology, so to speak. Chimpanzees have ''cultural traditions," if one 
means that variant acquired behaviors are imitated in different chim-
panzee troops. Birds in their flocks do this as well. But there is no clear 
evidence that chimpanzees attribute mental states to others. The editors 
of a volume on Chimpanzee Cultures concede that chimpanzees may be 
'"restricted to private conceptual worlds" (Wrangham et al. 1994, 2). 
Organisms with zero-order intentionality have no beliefs or desires at 
all. Higher animals clearly intend to change the behavior of other ani-
mals, first-order intentionality. Second-order intentionality involves intent 
to change the mind, as distinguished from the behavior (though perhaps 
the behavior as well) of another animal, that is, to teach by passing ideas 
from mind to mind. Third-order intentionality involves knowledge that 
another, a teacher, is intending to change one's mind. Primates do not 
seem to realize that there are minds present to teach in others, although 
they often imitate each other's behavior. 
Asking "how monkeys see the world," Dorothy L. Cheney and 
Robert M. Seyfarth conclude that, in such higher-order senses of commu-
nication, "signaler and recipient take into account each others' states of 
mind. By this criterion, it is highly doubtful that any animal signals could 
ever be described as truly communicative" (1990, 142-143). They 
continue: 
It is far from clear whether any nonhurnan primates ever communicate 
with the intent to inform in the sense that they recognize that they have 
information that others do not possess. . . . There is as yet little evi-
dence of any higher-order intentionality among nonhurnan species. ... 
Teaching would seem to demand some ability to attribute states of 
mind to others. ... Even in the most well documented cases, however, 
active instruction by adults seems to be absent. ... The social environ-
ment in most primate species is probably too simple to require 
higher-order intentionality. (1990, 209, 223, 252) 
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What is missing is precisely what makes a human cumulative trans-
missible culture possible, ideas passing from mind to mind, parent to 
child, teacher to pupil, in large part through the medium of language. 
What the 99% or 95% overlooks is that humans have three times the 
cerebral cortex of chimpanzees, so from that perspective the 3% (to split 
the difference) genetically leaves us 300% better endowed cognitively. 
Patterns of gene expression in humans and chimps are quite a bit differ-
ent in the brain (Paabo 2003). These codings in the brain, configuring and 
reconfiguring the synaptic connections as new perceptual skills and cog-
nitive information is acquired, are regularly called "maps" by the 
cognitive scientists, which suggests not only functional usefulness but also 
correlation and correspondence with the outside world. "In most cases, 
the maps correspond obviously to features of the outside world" (Bear, 
Connors, Paradiso 2002, 277). 
Humans still have genes, of course; but humans live under what 
Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson call "a dual inheritance system" 
(1985). That underscores knowledge as a social construction, rather than 
a somatic construction. Our 95-99% genetic and somatic identity with 
the chimpanzees is misleading, if we try to draw epistemic conclusions. 
Humans have a 300% gain, and this makes possible the cumulative trans-
mission of what this increased cerebral power gains in each generation, 
an escalating gain compounding the 300% over the millennia of culture. 
One could fear that these social environments superposed on our nat-
ural embodiments make our epistemic problems still worse, adding 
another layer of filter and distortion. But things might be the other way 
around, that our concepts arrange for new percepts. Our percepts come 
by nature, more or less. Our concepts come by nurture, more or less. One 
sees green by natural endowments. One has to be educated about photo-
synthesis. The two become entwined, of course. But maybe cumulative 
transmissible cultures, at least some of them, do an end run around our 
genetically transmitted perceptual abilities. We figure out what is in, with, 
and under the green—photosynthesis. 
All our acting, knowing, valuing is done with our human faculties. If 
there are wolves who act, know, and value, they will do it from their 
wolfish perspective. If there are spruce trees that act on their photosyn- 
thetic know-how and value solar energy, they will do it from their 
sprucely perspective—if there is such a thing. If there are Martians who 
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act, know, and value, they will do it from their Martian perspective. 
Wherever there are agents who do such things, they must use their own 
capacities. But this is no conclusion of the matter; this is only a starting 
point. The inquiry continues: With those owned capacities, how far can 
we humans know what is outside ourselves? Can we identify other iden-
tities, such as wolves, with their own integrity? Can humans say what 
Martians must know about wolves, if they get wolves right? Or photo-
synthesis, if they get spruce right? Can humans insist that Martians too, 
if they get wolves right and are moral agents, ought to respect wolves and 
not cause their extinction? Or do our humanly gained facts, acts, and val-
ues apply only to those who are similarly placed? 
Environmental ethics is lived on a geographical landscape. This 
ethics must be inhabited; it takes narrative form and needs personal back-
ing (Rolston 1988, Chapter 9; 1998). In this knowledge and caring we 
need "participation," or "belonging," or "community," or "location" "sit-
uation,'' "residence," or "presence," "encounter," "embodiment," or 
"solidarity." We cannot escape relationship, ambience, surroundings, 
interaction, nor do we wish to. So why not accept that in such encounter, 
nature always wears a "human face"? By doing that I could avoid my 
"quaint ontological commitments" (Harlow 1992, 29). Why worry fur-
ther about otherness out there? Environmental ethics is about being 
native to a place, so why not think of it as choosing our human story? 
"Environmental ethics is inescapably human-centered" (Harlow 
1992, 29). 
But what if there is more story to consider, solidarity with others in a 
larger biotic community, about whom we must gain truth enough to 
know something of their shared places before we can rightly choose ours? 
Perhaps we need to know what we are in the center of? Perhaps we need 
to escape our eccentric human self-centeredness and see outside our 
sector. 
3. SUBJECTS PLACED AMONG OBJECTS 
We human subjects think we know a world of objects out there. 
Mark Johnson summarizes this view, which he finds quite mistaken: 
The world consists of objects that have properties and stand in various 
relationships independent of human understanding. The world is as it 
is, no matter what any person happens to believe about it, and there is 
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one correct "God's-Eye-View" about what the world is really like. In 
other words, there is a rational structure to reality, independent of the 
beliefs of any particular people, and correct reason mirrors this 
rational structure. (1987, x) 
In fact, claims Hilary Putnam, we humans can have only a limited 
objectivity, realism with a human face: 
Our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are . . . deeply inter-
woven with our psychology. They depend on our biology and our 
culture; they are by no means 'value free'. But they are our conceptions, 
and they are conceptions of something real. They define a kind of 
objectivity, objectivity for us, even if it is not the metaphysical objec-
tivity of the God's Eye view. Objectivity and rationality humanly 
speaking are what we have; they are better than nothing. (1981, 55) 
Putnam continues, "There is a real world but we can only describe it 
in terms of our own conceptual schemes" (1978, 32). Every act of know-
ing ipso facto gets "conceptually contaminated" (1981, 54). This 
contamination is so drastic that: " 'Objects' do not exist independently of 
conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce 
one or another scheme of description." (1981, 52, emphasis in original, 
with "objects" in quotes in the first but not the second sentence.) "There 
is a commonsense way of clearing up the puzzle about how many objects 
there are in the room, and that is to say, "It depends on what you mean by 
object'" (1988,113). 
Such incarnate, contaminated epistemologists are anxious to make 
the point that we can speak of a thing only as we frame it up by our per-
ceptions and conceptions, which exercise immense control over what we 
can know. But they are over-anxious and suppress how we manage to see 
quite well through these window frames. What if these epistemologists 
leave the room and go on a field trip? Putnam concedes that this must be 
"pragmatic realism" (1988, 114): "The very inputs upon which our 
knowledge is based are conceptually contaminated; but contaminated 
inputs are better than none. If contaminated inputs are all we have, still 
all we have has proved to be quite a bit" (1981, 54). We do have to walk 
around the trees; we cope in the world rather successfully. 
But, back in a philosophical mood: Will we see any "trees," as we 
walk around them? Well, continues Putnam, it depends on what you 
mean by "tree." "Even when we see such a 'reality' as a tree, the possibil- 
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ity of that perception is dependent on a whole conceptual scheme in 
place" (1988, 113). Are you going to count the shrubby willows? "Trees" 
as a class of being exists after we have constructed a class into which to 
put trees. 
But it does not follow that these trees, both the big spruce, which 
nobody disputes, and the shrubby willows, which we do decide to count, 
after these experiences of classifying them, were not there in the forest 
before our experiences, objects which we have come to know about. 
Philosophers can make this point with scare quotes. "Trees" as a class 
that English-speakers have constructed does have to be learned about, 
and decisions have to be made about how big shrubs need to be to count 
as trees. That class "trees," as a result of its connotation, denotes items in 
the forest and field, living trees out there in the world. "Trees" are a 
named category of experience; other sorts of beings, such as snakes or the 
trees themselves, might well have no such made-up category, the snakes 
because of the ground level native range embodiment at which they 
crawl, the trees because they lack mind enough to form such conceptions. 
But trees (without scare quotes) are not a named category of experience; 
they are items found in the world, objectively there. We can and do label 
them so because of their objective similarities, which is the basis of our 
placing them into the various species into which botanists classify them. 
One March day I was lucky in Yellowstone National Park. I had a 
"three canid day": spotting wolves, coyotes, and red fox. An epistemolo- 
gist could, by stretching the point, say that my good day depended mostly 
on how I chose to make up objects in my world. Wolves (Canis lupus) and 
coyotes (Canis latrans) are in the genus Canis; the fox was Vulpes vulpes; 
all three are in family Canidae. Checking my life list of canids, am I to 
include the wild dogs, Lycaon pictus, twice seen on lucky days in Africa? 
They are not in Canis either, with only four toes instead of five, yet in 
Canidae. That is Putnam's point: "We must observe that 'of the same kind' 
makes no sense apart from a categorical system which says what proper-
ties do and what properties do not count as similarities" (1981, 52-53). 
But the pleasure I took in such spotting was primarily in locating wild 
lives, individuals in species lines, out there in the world. True, I view 
wolves from my located self, using eyes, coloring them grey, and I under-
stand them in terms of my conceptual scheme—as predators after prey, 
stalking downwind, magnificent evolutionary achievements, Canis 
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lupus—not as "big, bad wolves." But how many wolf-objects did I see of 
the Druid pack? It seems quite implausible to say: "That depends on what 
you mean by 'wolf' and what you choose to count as similarities." 
I watched four wolves attack and fail to kill one elk; they then went 
over a low hill and killed another, just out of sight, and ate the carcass all 
morning. We figured the kill out from ravens perched in the aspens above 
and wolves coming and going with bloody noses. Did not the wolves eat 
the elk, after locating this herd while on the hunt by using their keen 
noses, killing one with various skills of sight and sound, muscle and loco- 
motion? The energy the wolves captured was earlier captured by elk 
grazing on forbs, captured earlier still by photosynthesizing, and this 
regardless of whether I happen to know about trophic pyramids or not. 
Embodied knowledge is present here, in both wolves and human 
observers, fitting into an embracing ecology. Further, the most knowl-
edgeable observers will need to exceed their particular embodiments for 
a fuller account. We have figured out that much. Even in the much-dis-
paraged "God's-eye view," disembodied and eye-less though God might 
be, God would have to reach a comparable account, affirming the reality 
of this Yellowstone time and place. 
We do not think that wolves, coyotes, and foxes come into being 
when we humans arrive and cut up the world into such objects, much less 
when the scientific systematists arrive and make their decisions about 
genus, species, and family. Nobody believes that these animals, or their 
species lines, come out of our minds. Wolves in the Druid Pack being "of 
the same kind" makes sense because, apart from any human categorical 
system, wolves—members of the species we designate Canis lupus— 
reproduce themselves over again and again, their genetically encoded 
information determining what properties count as the similarities needed 
to make another wolf. 
These wolf-acts are wolf-facts. Humans, in their categorical systems, 
get wolves right when they describe such objective processes and their 
products. Humans also get wolves right when they group them among the 
vertebrates and the heterotrophs. Humans cannot cut up the world any 
way they please; they have "to carve nature at the joints" (recalling Plato, 
Phaedrus, 265e). 
"We cut up the world into objects?" Our human-acts make up the 
wolf-objects? Is there then only some undifferentiated flux before we cut? 
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No, Putnam backs off a bit, we should not describe the view of the 
anthropic realist as one "in which the mind makes up the world. . . If one 
must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind 
and the world jointly make up the mind and the world" (1981, xi). The 
metaphor is not that of a "cookie cutter" stamping out wolves from an 
undifferentiated dough; rather we have to make ourselves a "lassoo" [sic] 
before we can catch anything, and what we catch depends on the ropes 
we throw out (1988, 113; 1981, 53). 
Yes, but lassos do catch objects, as cookie cutters do not. Should we 
lasso a wolf, any person from any culture, or other wolves in their differ-
ent bodies, or Martians, even a disembodied God, could see that. We 
catch the wolf with percept and concept; but we do not jointly make up 
the wolf by lassoing it. Why not say, more precisely, that we can choose 
various sets in which to collect things—but that some of these sets are 
registering natural forms. Our construction of some sets is constrained by 
what has been constructed by nature. There are, sometimes, judgments of 
our choice about which labels to use for these different natural kinds of 
things (different canids) that we find. Sort our labels as we may, however, 
the question is not, fundamentally, our categories of choice, but whether 
we confront, at the native range level, a natural kind in Canis lupus, one 
that all humans and God too must recognize because this kind is found 
ready-made by natural processes. 
What is getting contaminated conceptually is epistemological making 
up the world with ontological making up the world, the order of know-
ing with the order of being. True, we humans make up our categories as 
we know the world; that is epistemology, found as much in science as 
anywhere else. But it is also true that the world made up these natural 
kinds once upon a time; that is ontology, and science convinces us of this 
too. These are two very different makings-up; and it only confuses them 
to telescope them into a joint metaphor. 
The Earth-world was quite made up with objects in it long before we 
humans arrived with our minds. The Earth is not a pliable recipient of 
whatever forms and properties we impose upon it. We make artifacts, but 
not the wild-facts. Mind-free, spontaneous nature speciated, filled up the 
world with five million species, through a turnover of perhaps five billion 
species. There is genesis and creativity long before we arrive with our dis-
tinctive human genius. 
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Indeed, the other way around. The Earth-world made up our minds 
over several billion years of evolutionary history, as it also made up our 
hands and our feet. We, with our embodied minds, are among the 
Earth-produced objects. True, our minds are unfinished, and we make up 
our metaphors in this construction, but joint make-up is another half 
truth, which becomes false in the whole. Our mind, with our words, is 
made to reach for objects as much as our hands, with our fingers. What 
the realist wishes to claim is that human-made epistemology can, and 
often does, track world-made wolves inhabiting the Yellowstone 
ecosystem. Our actual knowing is factual knowing. 
Ontologically, we should begin with an account of being and becom-
ing in the world out there, and, at or near the end of this account, move 
inside to the mind "in here" and how it knows what is out there. Episte- 
mologically, we do have to start within and move out, with constructed 
percepts and constructs. We may find sometimes that objects and 
processes in the world are conceptually clarified as much as conceptually 
contaminated by our linguistic conceptions. Our percepts and concepts 
constitute our knowledge; and, equally, our knowing (to use still another 
c-word) is constrained by objects and events out there. 
The root idea in the word "objective" is that one is "thrown against" 
something out there in the world, whether "objects" such as wolves and 
elk or processes such as natural selection and food pyramids." Our knowl-
edge is shaped and reshaped by them. One inescapable conclusion is that 
many of these objects and events are there before and after, as well as 
while we are thrown against them. Although it is possible to doubt this in 
moments of philosophical speculation, no one in any culture really lives 
doubting the existence of an external world. The question continues: We 
humans are knowing subjects placed among dynamic objects. What 
grounds have we for our beliefs? 
4. EPISTEMIC SUPPORT: GROUNDS AND FOUNDATIONS 
We need support for our beliefs, else we cannot separate the true 
from the false ones, or, if you prefer, the better from the worse. By some 
accounts, our propositions (beliefs) are justified by a reliable chain of 
inference that bottoms out (is founded on) indubitable basic facts, truths. 
Mediately justified beliefs require epistemic support for their validity in 
immediately justified beliefs. Systems of knowledge, in content or 
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method, require first principles, There will be some set of self-evident sup-
porting beliefs, the ultimate terminating points for chains of justification. 
Our more complex beliefs can be warranted by appealing to some basic 
items of knowledge that are self-evident or beyond doubt. There are ulti-
mate terminating points of justification. 
This account is labeled "foundationalism," usually a pejorative name. 
I do not recall ever having chosen the word to describe my position, but 
am nevertheless accused of being one (Norton 1992, 218), guilty of "dis-
astrous epistemological commitments" (Norton 1995, 329), Any 
foundationalist account faces two questions: (1) What are these bottom 
foundations: Sense data? Clear and distinct ideas? Self-evident facts of the 
matter. First order empirical experiences? (2) What sorts of inference are 
reliable, built on these reliable foundations? Induction? Deduction? 
The objection here cannot be that some beliefs are founded on other 
beliefs; no one denies that. Nor is the problem that some beliefs are more 
settled than others; no one denies that. The objection is that in our chains 
of beliefs, inference built on inference, we never "hit bottom." Rather, 
according to W. V. Quine, the better epistemology is that of a "web of 
belief" (Quine and Ullian 1978). Our beliefs go round and round, beliefs 
latched onto other beliefs, each belief held up by its ties to other beliefs, 
the webwork nowhere bottoming out in belief-facts that are unsupported 
by the network, but which rather support all the beliefs piled up on top 
of these foundational beliefs. There are, indeed, myriads of connections, 
but these are not long, one directional chains of inference. All the strands 
mutually reinforce each other, perceptual strands made possible by our 
bodies, and conceptual strands made possible by our cultures. 
Our beliefs have " founders," our forebears who originated them and 
sorted out the knowledge into which we get ourselves educated. These 
foundations lie in our social, conceptual, linguistic heritage, Quine claims: 
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs ... is a man-made fab-
ric which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . .  In point of 
epistemological footing, the physical objects . . . enter our conception 
only as cultural posits" (1980,42,44). 
That seems plausible, as far as it goes, and provided that it doesn't go 
too far. "Man only deceives himself when he regards his own linguistic 
constructs as embodying some trans-anthropological truth. . . . Man, like 
the spider, spins out of himself the world which he inhabits" (Soskice 
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1985, 80, summarizing and criticizing Jacques Derrida). But that forgets 
that these physical objects appearing as cultural posits will still require 
grounding. Make your network as big as you please and knot the strands 
together tightly. This is all to no avail, unless and until the net is some-
where hooked up, attached—if not on ground bottom, then to tie points: 
a tree limb, a rock. Quine knows that there is still the where-is-the-con- 
tact-with-the-world problem—as much with nets as with foundations. 
My world picture "hangs together," but it also "hangs onto" fundamental 
experiences, constraint points where my beliefs hit reality. "Creatures 
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic ... tendency to die 
before reproducing their kind" (Quine 1969,126). There is plenty of test-
ing for realism in the web of belief. 
Mountain climbers need to be roped together but the climbers need, 
even more, anchor points where their ropes touch the ground. The natu-
ral contact is as important as the social contact. Both sets of contacts will 
shift around as the climbers progress. There are no "absolute founda-
tions" here, but neither can our epistemically cognitive bodies do without 
grounded support. Placing a web, we bump into objects hard enough that 
these encounters revise any local claims, and, with enough of these we 
may shift the whole net. Suitably grounded, nets can be arranged to catch, 
but they do not invent what they "lasso." We fabricate nets, but the catch is 
discovery, not fabrication. 
We humans, embodied, are involved in the gathering of evidence the 
quality and implications of which we must judge. If we live, we must live 
some "where," as we must live some "how." We will do all our thinking 
from this "where" and "how." That gives our knowledge, if you like, "a 
human face." But if we are clever we can gather evidence in our own life- 
supporting epoch and region about times and places in which we could 
not live or have evolved. Mind can exceed its locality, as we do when we 
study chemoautotrophs and chemoheterotrophs living in the hot water at 
the openings of deep sea vents and which need no light for energy but oxi-
dize inorganic substances such as hydrogen sulfide or ammonia. We then 
research whether these were the primitive forms of life in an oxygen-free 
atmosphere on Earth. Well, yes, critics may reply, but all such knowledge 
is still Earthbound. Then notice that while the biologists were discovering 
the deep sea life, the astronomers were discovering black holes in space. 
We can gather evidence about life forms not our own, other kinds of 
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"how" even in this "where" of our own location. If the spiders or the 
chemoheterotrophs start gathering evidence and framing worldviews 
about themselves, or us, or the solar system, or black holes, or life in the 
anaerobic evolutionary period, then we will wish to talk to them about 
whether their views are arachno-centric or chemotropho-centric, biased 
by their "where" and their "how." Meanwhile we are looking from here, 
from where we are, but with enormous cognitive power, nowhere better 
demonstrated than in the natural sciences. 
The natural sciences do open up a world that is objectively there; they 
contact, catch, describe it more and less accurately—evolutionary history 
with its dinosaurs and primates, ecology with its genetics and trophic pyr-
amids. This network hits up against a hardworld of experience, and some 
points on the network (points constructed by theory and tested in expe-
rience) are so much tied into empirical observation (theory-laden though 
this is), that their "foundation" (their warrant) is equally theory and 
world encounter. The support for the belief lies as much in a sense of 
world contact as does it lie in linkage to other beliefs. There is not simply 
webbing, idea to idea, word to word, concept to concept, but there is 
feedback and feed forward, idea to world, word to world, concept to per-
cept to objects and processes out there. We do not just test coherence. We 
test connect-up, correlation, coordination—yes, correspondence. Ultimate 
foundations? True in all possible worlds? Maybe not. But in this world 
some things have been "found" out, though they are not self-evident. 
These facts include valuing found located out there. A wolf values 
elk; elk flee because they value their own lives. Such values are found 
when we see nature through a culturally established framework, and we 
can set up arguments for such values. These arguments do hit the ground 
("bottom out") in experience. Our "acts" encounter "facts." These are 
"my" arguments; with others who share them they are "our" arguments; 
but they are "grounded" in contact with values out there. When found, 
these intrinsic values are terminating points of justification. 
Reaching them, value needs no further justification or contributory 
reference, though there are always such webworks of reference present, if 
one wishes to look. So I do not say that I find "ultimate" or "absolute" 
foundations. But I do encounter "local" centers of value, that constrain, 
or ought to constrain, our behavior, should we jeopardize such value. Val-
ues are "grounded" on what is "found." Other persons, failing such 
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"acts," miss the "facts." That makes me an epistemic empiricist. From the 
premise that we humans are embodied we do not always have to draw 
the conclusion that our knowledge is parochial. 
Do I have a fallibilist commitment to a corrigible point of view? Yes, 
I join fallibilists scattered all across intellectual history. We "see through 
a glass darkly" (1 Corinthians 13.12); truth in the Reformation heritage 
is semper reformanda, always reforming. But some things that I believe 
(that Earth is round, that thorns have adaptive value) are so "settled"—a 
reliable, foundation-like word—that I would be much surprised to find 
them corrected in my web of beliefs. They are not in principle beyond 
doubt, but they are in practice never seriously doubted. I have this much 
of a "God's eye view"; God also finds, or ought to find, that trees photo- 
synthesize and that water and nitrogen are of value to them here on 
Earth. 
I am always using certain standards of my community inquiry, but 
also I bump up against constraints that can lead me to reject what my 
community has concluded. In fact, that is a summary of my career: My 
teachers all told me that nature was intrinsically valueless; that is what I 
was educated to believe. But my encounters with nature led me to reject 
that webwork of belief. The facts of the matter (organisms webworked 
into biotic communities) caused me to reject the conclusions of my social 
community. Consensus—at least the consensus of my rearing and col-
leagues—was not the touchstone of truth. 
I reached the conviction that plants, objectively and without subjec-
tive experience, are valuing organisms. My botanical inquiries, made 
possible by textbook, microscope, and field experience, led me to plant 
encounters where the plants in place out there refused their place in my 
inherited web-system of beliefs (that plants were valueless machines). It 
was not some other belief in the web that revised this one. This belief 
"touched ground" wrong. "Grounds with roots" is a better botanical 
metaphor than "foundations with stones." My beliefs are a webwork, net-
ted together, yes. But my beliefs located me in a webworked world, where 
flora and fauna, humans included, are netted together. I was, if you like, 
relating to those plants through interpreted experience, incarnate in flesh 
as I did so. I did carry them home, dissect them, and look them up in the 
manuals. But there were encounters across my membranes that revised 
my interpretive framework. The plants critiqued my theory. 
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A new belief, revised into the former web of beliefs, resulted. The 
worldview into which I was educated preconditioned my encounter—at 
first, but later my encounters constrained and reconstituted my world- 
view. The reason for the change was not incoherence within my belief 
system. The change was constrained by plant encounters, forcing revised 
beliefs—although, if I looked around, there were indeed some of my 
beliefs (about survival value of thorns) that could be hooked into and 
support my new beliefs. And there were always a few maverick thinkers 
that gave me comfort. 
So I have reached some "core beliefs" less revisable than others. A 
reason is that these beliefs seem more constrained by the world, or by 
back-inference from encounters in it, Here my web of beliefs more reli-
ably (dare I say it) corresponds—co-responds—to reality. 
5. CO-RESPONDING ON EARTH 
No, my sophisticated critics will immediately object. If epistemolo- 
gists learned any thing at all in the last century, they learned to reject 
correspondence. The early Ludwig Wittgenstein took a correspondence 
view: "If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with 
what it depicts" (1922, 1961, Proposition 2.16). Later, Wittgenstein got 
smarter. "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (1958, sec. 
43). The main feature of language is that we humans are always trying to 
do something with it; and so the coping comes first, and copying is the 
wrong way to think of it. Cognition is always "know how" and never 
"know that." Any idea that we can check up on our descriptions accord-
ing to an extra-linguistic how-things-really-are is an illusion, for there is 
no "behind" to language, no "out there" that we can consult non-linguis- 
tically. We are always inside our language, like we are always inside our 
skins, managing our way—or poised on our webs, on the catch, if you 
prefer that metaphor. 
More lately still, Richard Rorty warns that we must not think that 
"Reason" offers "a transcultural human ability to correspond to reality"; 
the best that reason can do is ask "about what self-image society should 
have of itself" (1991, 28). The big mistake is "to think that the point of 
language is to represent a hidden reality which lies outside us" (1989,19). 
Formerly, naively, we used to ask whether the words in our language 
about nature have extensions to which their intensions successfully refer. 
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Now we ask, more pragmatically, how well our words help us function; 
for that is why and how language evolved, a survival skill for a social pri-
mate incarnate in flesh, making a way through the world, seeing "green," 
avoiding "wolves," and hunting "elk." "Representation, as opposed to 
increasingly complex adaptive behavior, is hard to integrate into an evo-
lutionary story" (Rorty 1998, 20). Science, philosophy, or whatever the 
endeavor: the effort is to manage a way of dealing with our environment. 
We humans are quite sophisticated about this, using computers and math-
ematics, debating environmental policy and ethics, but in principle we 
and the animals are doing the same thing, "Adaptive management" is our 
version of "adapted fit." 
Does not all this coping require some copying? Begin with those ani-
mals. Is a wolf's view of an elk, scouting the herd, then the chase, ending 
in a kill, complex adaptive behavior that is hard to reconcile with repre-
sentation? Prima fade, the presumption is the other way round. Unless 
the wolf pack can accurately locate the herd, pick out the aging, slightly 
lame elk, and track it in the chase, there is no kill, and no survival. The 
wolves, of course, see the world through their niche; they see (and smell) 
food. But they equally have to see objectively the lame elk they select. 
Nothing about this epistemology needs to be "absolute," or "ultimate," or 
even "foundational." But their knowing does have to be accurate, factual, 
or their acting will fail. Perceptions do have to re-present the elk, to pres- 
ent the elk on location. 
Are we humans less capable? Our noses are, but not our minds. If the 
"corresponding" of mind with world is too troublesome, begin with 
another metaphor: Language is "co-ordinated" with reality, like Cartesian 
co-ordinates overlaid on the world in order that we can map it. The locat-
ing co-ordinates are our invention; what we locate with them was in place 
before we took up our search. Biologists construct cladograms, branched 
diagrams of relationships between taxa of organisms, based on morpho-
logical and molecular characters, and use these to infer phylogenetic trees. 
These, biologists claim, diagram the evolutionary history across which 
these descendent taxa (usually species) developed from branching ances-
tral lines. 
This often results in various possible trees, called "inferred trees," and 
biologists attempt to resolve which one is what they call "the true tree" 
(Grauer and Li 2000, 173). Molecular data often resolve what were hith- 
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erto ambiguities in the morphological trees, bringing them, they claim, 
closer to the true tree. Surely that involves the claim that some one of 
their considered trees (often these trees are "constructed" using computer 
programs) is in fact the real one, that is, the one that represents, re-pres-
ents now to biologists, the routes of inheritance that in fact took place 
long ago out there in the world. "In a species tree, a bifurcation represents 
the time of speciation" (Grauer and Li 175, emphasis added). Of course 
a phylogenetic tree does not "look like" these plants and animals dia-
grammed, nothing is in any literal sense "pictured." But, when biologists 
are successful, truth is "depicted" because there is verisimilitude between 
the diagram (with its supporting texts) and the world. 
The biological journals that specialize in systematics are full of arti-
cles analyzing how to get artifacts and other inadequacies (such as what 
they call "long branch attraction," or the confusing of synapomorphies 
and homologies, etc.) out of the cladograms produced by the computers 
and get the result that is true to evolutionary history. Simon Conway 
Morris, a paleontologist, remarks: "Constructing phylogenies is central to 
the evolutionary enterprise, yet rival schemes are often contradictory. Can 
we really recover the true history of life?" (Conway Morris 2000,1). The 
test of a successful phylogeny, or cladogram, is whether it is co-ordinated 
with what has taken place out there in the world. The cladogram is a sort 
of map. Maps sketch; they are useful, but only when they correspond 
with the terrain. 
Such co-ordination can certainly seem like description, I am looking 
at a Potentilla. The fact stated in the flora manual that Potentilla has five 
sepals does have "something in common with what it depicts" (Wittgen-
stein), those five green flaps of tissue beneath the flower there under the 
microscope. The "sepals" are not my construction simply because I must 
conceive of them in language. I read the botanical text, mostly words and 
a few sketches; and, reading the text, I read the plants. The text says: 
"sepals with stellate pubescence on underside." I had not looked; but now 
I lay down text, put my eyes back to the binocular scope, take a dissect-
ing needle, turn over a sepal, and, sure enough, there are the stellate hairs. 
The text enables me to read the world because my forebears in botany 
consulted the world. 
Yes, I am "seeing it" as "a sepal," as "stellate pubescence" on the 
"underside." But these concepts, into which I have been educated, fashion 
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my perception and equally they facilitate it. There is, if you like, a "lan-
guage game" (Wittgenstein) about what counts as a "sepal." How many 
sepals are there? It "depends on what you mean by 'sepal'." See that sepal- 
like-object-cum-cultural-posit out there, it is described as a "sepal"—at 
least the bigger lobes are. In Potentilla, are you going to count those 
smaller "bracts" between the larger five "sepals"? In fact, what plants do 
we put in Potentilla? Mostly they have five sepals and five bracts, but then 
there is tormentil, Potentilla erecta, with only four. Is not a conceptual 
scheme framing up what the botanist sees? 
Yes, but what the botanist sees is equally constraining the descrip-
tions of species and genera. Botanists "place" erecta in Potentilla because 
of other family resemblances in flower and see structure—and we are 
talking about "resemblances," things "placed" out there in the world that 
look alike, similar morphologies, and they do so because of their evolu-
tionary histories. There are judgment calls about how much they are 
alike, but that there are discovered resemblances in fact is beyond doubt. 
Say if you like that the systematists are helping us cope—better floras give 
us better control over the landscapes we inhabit—but they succeed by 
better corresponding, co-responding, co-ordinating with what is there. 
Yes, the botanists have their world view at stake, and their success val-
orizes Western science. But equally the scientific categories work because, 
cumulatively from the sustained critical inquiry of systematists, they bet-
ter co-ordinate with the objective world. 
Language is not just for encountering and conversing with each 
other; language is for encountering and getting along on Earth, in the 
world we inhabit. That makes perceptive pragmatists into realists. Karen 
Barad concludes, with emphasis: "Realism is not about representations of 
an independent reality, but about the real consequences, interventions, 
creative possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting within the 
world" (1996, 188, her italics). Knowing is always "in between," never 
"independent." Barad asks rhetorically: "Why would we be interested in 
such a thing as an 'independent reality' anyway? We don't live in such a 
world" (1996,185). 
Ask the zoologists. Wolves? Yes, indeed there are consequences, cre-
ative possibilities, and responsibilities of interacting with them. But in 
order to evaluate what these responsibilities are we need to know some-
thing about the wolf independent reality, what they are in themselves, 
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their own possibilities as created beings. On the basis of what is presented 
(re-presented) to us about their own form of life, zoologists-become-ethi- 
cists might resolve, as far as possible, to restore wolves to Yellowstone 
and then to let them be, minimizing our interactions with them. 
We might wish to prevent the extinction of Canus lupus at our hands, 
while also recalling that dire wolves. Canus dirus, went extinct millennia 
back, uncertain whether this happened naturally, perhaps as a result of 
changing Pleistocene climates, or by human hand, aboriginal hunters 
migrating into the New World. Realism about dire wolves hardly seems 
only about the consequences, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of 
our interacting with them. Rather, we live in a world in which dire wolves 
once upon a time did—as grey wolves today do—have their long-stand-
ing independent reality. It is just that creativity, its processes and projects, 
that we wish appropriately to re-present to ourselves, and in environmen-
tal ethics to respect and save it. 
After all, the less we really know about nature, the less we can or 
ought save nature for what it is in itself, intrinsically. We will find it dif-
ficult to know how we ought to behave toward others, if we do not know 
what their goods or interests are, before we get there and after we leave. 
Indeed, if we know that little, it may be hard properly to value nature 
even instrumentally when we are interacting with nonhuman others. 
Pragmatic adaptive management requires accurate assessments of what is 
going on. We cannot correctly value what we do not to some degree cor-
rectly know. How can we care for others if we cannot see outside our 
skins enough to know both that they exist in their different modes of 
being and that they have their own fields of significance? We will do this, 
of course, from within our skins and languages; and these things will 
come to have significance for us. Still, the environment, the biotic com-
munity, cannot be reduced to our field of significance, any more than can 
the cultural community be reduced to my field of significance. 
Maybe all those nonhuman creatures out there are just coping and 
incapable of representation. Maybe most humans are like this too, their 
seeming truth claims nothing more, really, than quite complex linguistic 
behavior arguing this or that ideology, pushing to get more of the 
speaker's genes into the next generation, proving their adapted fit. But if 
that is what evolutionary biologists are trying to do, subtly with their 
complex persuasive, seemingly argumentative behaviors, that and nothing 
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more, this would supply ample reason to distrust the theory. Their argu-
ments would become self-serving and discredit their theory. 
Evolutionary theory, superficially, may seem to demand that our 
knowledge be local coping and nothing much more. But think further, 
"Evolutionary theory" is counterevidence to evolutionary theory. The 
bizarre fact that this one species, Homo sapiens, can discover, critique, 
evaluate this transcending overview of 3.5 billion years of life history on 
Earth is not at all easy to reconcile with complex adaptive behavior 
selected to increase one's share of genes in the pool, next generation. If 
anything at all in science seems a description of events in nature inde-
pendently of human genetic coding or phenotypic coping, it is these 
claims that biologists make about what went on on Earth long before we 
humans arrived. Quite contrary to Rorty, the evolutionary story is incred-
ible unless it is descriptive of natural history, and the warrant for that 
cannot be complex adaptive fit, more genes for these biologists in the next 
generation. 
Surely a more plausible account is that our inputs are "constructed" 
and the main reason that some are better than others is that some 
co-respond, re-presenting to us more accurately the number of wolves 
and which one of the elk they are stalking. Incarnate epistemic actors 
need to know such facts. And this has been greatly elaborated by the 
linguistic webs we spin, catching facts outside our native range, 
discovering also that the energy the wolves capture in the elk was earlier 
captured in photosynthesis at the molecular level, and that these 
ecologies have a long, dynamic evolutionary history. 
6. HUMAN GENIUS: TRANSCENDING LOCATION 
We never experience a dis-embodied and un-placed mind. But we do 
gain views that look out from our bodies and places and see what is out- 
of-my-body and out-of-my-place. We enjoy a native incarnation and a 
native residence. Had we been microbes or octopuses, our native ranges 
of perception and conception would be different. But we humans also 
enjoy a surprising transcendence of localized body and place. We are 
always situated somewhere, but it does not follow that all our knowledge 
is situational. Our epistemic compositions enable us to enlarge our geo-
graphical positions; we discover more of nature's compositions. Oddly, 
what was once and still is a part in a whole, Homo sapiens now also 
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understands and oversees the whole and its parts, reshapes parts and the 
whole, jeopardizes the whole and its parts. The behavior of this part, 
owing to critical cultural innovations and decisions, is no longer pre-
dictable or controlled by the whole. 
Microscopes and telescopes come immediately to mind, making visi-
ble the microbes and galaxies, of which humans were long unaware with 
their native-range eyesight. But much further; we can learn about photo-
synthesis, an Earth-bound event out of our native range, and discover that 
it is fundamental for life on Earth, and this Earth-fact is true for all 
observers, earthlings or not. A forest cannot be understood simply by 
looking long and hard at it, with one's body in an appropriate place, even 
aided by microscopes and telescopes. To understand a forest, one needs 
concepts, such as carbon bonding, oxidation, oxygen balance, photosyn-
thesis, and knowledge of glucose, cellulose, or nutrients such as nitrogen 
and phosphorous. Science takes away the colors, if you insist; apart from 
beholders, there is no autumn splendor or spring green. But science gives 
us the trees solidly there, photosynthesizing without us, energetically vital 
to the system of life of which we are also a part. 
Alone among the species on Earth, all of them embodied, Homo sapi-
ens is cognitively remarkable. With our instrumented intelligences and 
constructed theories, we now know of phenomena at structural levels 
from quarks to quasars. We measure distances from picometers to the 
extent of the visible universe in light years, across 40 orders of magnitude. 
We measure the strengths of the four major binding forces in nature 
(gravity, electromagnetism, the strong and weak nuclear forces), again 
across 40 orders of magnitude. We measure time at ranges across 34 
orders of magnitude, from attoseconds to the billions-of-years age of the 
universe. Nature gave me my mind-sponsoring brain; nature gave me my 
hands. Nature did not give me radiotelescopes with which to "see" pul-
sars, or relativity theory with which to compute time dilation. These come 
from human genius, but nature supplies the marvelous processes analyzed 
by radiotelemetry and relativity theory. 
These extremes are beyond our embodied experience. No one expe-
riences a light year or a picosecond. But they are not beyond our 
comprehension entirely, else we could not use such concepts so effectively 
in science. The instrumentation is a construction (microscopes and math-
ematics), a "social construct," if you must. But precisely this construction 
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enables us dramatically to extend our native ranges of perception. The 
construction dis-embodies us. It distances us from our embodiment. No 
one has an everyday "picture" of a quark or a pulsar. So if you want to 
lampoon the perfect "mirror" image at these extremes of range, this is 
easy to do. But we have good theory why nothing can be "seen" at such 
ranges in ordinary senses of "see," which requires light in the wavelength 
range of 400-700 nanometers, with quarks and pulsars far outside that 
range. We can ask whether a molecule is too small to be colored, or 
whether an a electron, in its superposition states, is so radically different 
as to have no position, no "place" in the native range sense, but only a 
probabilistic location. 
Yes, replies the embodied epistemologist, but body is more present 
than we realize in such mind. Take the concept of "balance," for instance, 
pivotal in organismic biology, in reactions in chemistry, or in equations in 
physics. "Balancing is an activity we learn with our bodies and not by 
grasping a set of rules or concepts," insists Mark Johnson. Learned in our 
own body states, balancing our weight on either side, we extrapolate and 
metaphorically extend it to other equilibria in biology, and on to balanc-
ing red-ox reactions, then to logic (whether one argument outweighs 
another), to ethics (whether on balance the judgment was just), and even 
to balancing mathematical equations. "Equality is a matter of balance . . . 
We balance the equation by performing the same operations on each side 
of the 'equals' sign" (1987, 74-87). 
But probing the origins of metaphors—"balance" in our walking 
upright—is not all that illuminating when we wonder what is the mixture 
of equilibrium and chaos, order and disorder in ecosystems. Every effort 
to deepen understanding, science included, originates somewhere in the 
available reservoir of human experience. So we will often attempt under-
standing by analogy. Metaphor makes initial contact, and then we 
critique the imagery, with counter-imagery, with more precision in analy-
sis, with measurement, further imagination. Science involves a long 
history of breaking up commonsense understandings with more sophisti-
cated ones. We greatly extrapolate and radically transform any such 
originating metaphor. When we say that ecosystems provide life "sup-
port," that "support" presumably employs a word once learned in 
ordinary life, but we do not learn much about this support from our habit 
of walking upright. We subject it to analytical criticism. 
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We may conclude that equilibrium theory (with its balance) and non- 
equilibrium (dis-balanced) theory represent two ends of a spectrum with 
real ecosystems somewhere in between. Whether one sees one or the other 
can depend on the level and scale of analysis. If density or community 
structure as a whole is studied, equilibria may appear never to be reached. 
However, at population levels, species diversity, or community composi-
tions, ecosystems can show more predictable patterns, and even approach 
steady states on restricted ranges (Koetsier et al, 1990). In well-studied 
areas, we get much the same species count over a century, similarly with 
what eats what, or what the community composition is. Numbers vary, 
densities shift with good seasons and bad, wetter, drier, colder, hotter; 
community composition changes after a fire. But the fluctuating processes 
are much the same over hundreds of years. 
R. V. O'Neill summarizes: those who see stability and those who see 
change are looking at two sides of one coin: "In fact, both impressions are 
correct, depending on the purpose and time-space scale of our observa-
tions" (1986, 3). "The dynamic nature of ecosystems," concludes Claudia 
Pahl-Wostl, is "chaos and order entwined" (1995). Such scientific study 
no longer seems all that limited by our being embodied with a need to 
walk upright. The constraints on our epistemology are not our flesh and 
blood experiences but rather are how far we can co-ordinate our ideas 
with the degrees of contingency and order in ecosystems out there. The 
stability we do discover is external to any inside our bodies, or to any we 
discover somatically by walking upright. 
Chaos too, some will object, must be first learned in ordinary life and 
extrapolated as metaphor to ecosystems. Maybe so. But we are quite 
remote from our native ranges when trying to decide whether the chaos 
is deterministic—similar to those sorts which can be mathematically gen- 
erated—or indeterministic, as a result of amplified quantum 
indeterminacies. We get loose enough from our positions and places to 
consider other time-space scales and other kinds of balance: species diver-
sity versus density dependent regulation. There is no direct connection 
between our bodily "balance" and stable, dynamic, or unstable ecosystem 
community composition. We are quite capable of asking whether even a 
parallelism is relevant or far-fetched. 
One uses concepts of balance to understand co-valent bonding, ionic 
bonding, Van der Waals bonds, subshells, quantum energy levels, none of 
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which are at all similar to corporate bodily experience. To the contrary, 
these are domains where intuition and everyday experience do not easily 
serve. Whatever we do figure out about them has to be translated into 
native range experience. Might it then be that "balance" is contaminating 
our understanding more than clarifying it? Or that it is only a metaphor, 
projected onto nature? 
The bask energy-use processes in ecosystems take place inside cells 
and involve glycolysis feeding into the Krebs cycle, releasing energy once 
stored in photosynthesis. The diagrams of these transformations in biol-
ogy textbooks are typically drawn in color and with curved arrows going 
round and about, single dashes for single bonds, double dashes for dou-
ble bonds. If one does the chemical equations for the dozen or so steps, 
they must be carefully balanced. These drawings are cartoons, if one 
wishes to call them that. These molecules are too small to be colored, and 
an electronic bond does not look like a dash. We realize our everyday 
bodily experiences are being transcended. 
Still, these diagrams sketch transformations that are taking place in 
nature. These diagrams, and the texts that accompany them, do not claim 
to be absolute, but they do claim to be veridical. That trees photosynthe- 
size is true for all observers because it is true independently of 
observers—as true in and for the trees as it is in and for observers of the 
trees. Martians too, whether they walk upright or not, will have to figure 
out the conservation of charge, energy, and mass, and balance their equa-
tions in photosynthesis and glycolysis. These essentially involve 
conservation laws, discovered through powerful and penetrating insight 
into nature, all of which is a long way from the bodily balance upright 
primates need. 
Some native range perceptions are metaphorically transferred and 
prove useful when understanding phenomena at other ranges. But it is 
just as true that science teaches us how native range perceptions can be 
deceptive: Trees are not really green, all by themselves. We have learned 
that the sun is not setting, that species are not fixed natural kinds. Earth 
is a diverse place: myriads of species, rocks, minerals, rivers, oceans, and 
mountains—but everything is made up of ninety-two elements, each 
made of a few simple if bizarre "particle-events," "wavicles": protons, 
electrons, neutrons. 
Physicists have discovered that the mass of the proton is almost the 
164     ETHICS    THE  ENVIRONMENT, 10(2) 2005 
same as the mass of the neutron; the electron is eighteen hundred times 
lighter, but with a charge that exactly balances that of the proton; they 
calculate how these figures could not vary much and have atoms still 
remain stable (Smolin 1997, 39-40). No routine bodily experiences trig-
ger such discoveries—certainly not that of walking upright. Nor does 
everyday experience—taste, touch, smell, sound, sight—suggest time dila-
tion in subatomic interactions, or Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in 
the location and momentum of elections and protons. Electrons, protons, 
neutrons are composed of quarks in turn, said, almost comically, to have 
their "flavors": "up, down, sideways, and charmed," and, more seriously, 
are thought to be too small to have location. 
George Lakoff claims that all "thought is embodied, that is, the struc-
tures used to put together our conceptual systems grow out of bodily 
experience and make sense in terms of it; moreover, the core of our con-
ceptual systems is directly grounded in perception, body movement, and 
experience of a physical and social character" (Lakoff 1987, xiv). But one 
commits the genetic fallacy to claim that, because once upon a time 
knowledge originated locally in bodily experiences and was elaborated 
through metaphors, now and always knowledge remains all and only of 
that kind. Evolve we once did, and embodied we remain, but there are 
genuine epistemic novelties. Earthlings can learn the Pythagorean theo-
rem in ancient Greece or at Colorado State University; it is the same in 
both places because it is not a body-bound, a place-bound, nor even an 
Earth-bound truth. Nor does the need to balance the square of the 
hypotenuse with the sum of the squares of the two sides arise from our 
walking upright. Although the brain with its mind evolved and exists in 
this world, the mind can imagine and reason in alternative worlds, as 
mathematicians do with their non-Euclidean geometries. 
Our bodies with their percepts, our minds with their concepts do not 
make our own location disappear, nor do we wish it could. Location gets 
expanded, re-located, builds up overviews of the whole. That does tran-
scend startpoint location enabling us to reach standpoint location greater 
than ourselves, No animal, humans included, knows everything going on 
at all levels, quarks to cosmos ("the God's eye view"). Some animals, 
sometimes humans, know nothing really of what is going on at any level; 
they have only functional behaviors, genetically coded or behaviorally 
acquired, that work, more or less, for survival. They have, if you like, lim- 
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ited know-how and no know-that. But some animals do cognize what is 
going on at some levels, typically with the animals a functional picture of 
their native range niche (the wolf sees the elk). Humans begin here, but 
can enjoy an epistemic genius, transcending their own sector and take an 
overview (Earth seen from space, hydrologic cycles), or take in particulars 
outside their embodiment (sonar in bats, low-frequency elephant commu-
nication). We are always agents in our knowing; yes, but our agency can 
increase our powers for becoming spectators. 
Continuing now, especially in the life sciences, just this transcending 
overview equally brings us ethical responsibility. At this range of vision, 
there are no detached, disinterested spectators; to the contrary, at such 
scope our agency returns, supercharged with existential responsibility. We 
can not only discover, for example, fact of the matter about order and dis-
order in biotic communities; we can worry about disorder we are 
introducing, and go on to ask what mix of order and disorder may be 
desired for ourselves or valuable for ecosystem integrity. The more inclu-
sive overview of what is going on has orienting, engaging truth value. 
Such science demands conscience. 
7. FACTS AND VALUES IN PLACE—ETHICS EN-ACTED 
Environmental ethics seeks answers to the question, "What shall we 
do with regard to nature?" This always puts us in place on the scene. An 
ethic is called for if and only if we are there interacting. No people, no 
ethics. But the answer often depends on what was going on before we 
arrived and on what is going on outside of our human domain. Humans 
find themselves uniquely emplaced on a unique planet—in their world 
cognitively, critically, and ethically as no other species is. Our bodily 
incarnation embeds us in this biospheric community; we are Earthlings. 
Our mental genius enables us to rise to transcending overview. Can and 
ought we to move from facts to values, from values in fact to ethics 
enacted? 
This exclusive, epistemic rational power has led, unfortunately, to an 
exclusive, axiological mistake. The prevailing Enlightenment conclusion, 
thought to be endorsed by science, is that the surprisingly rational species 
is the sole locus of value. One might have thought that discovering our-
selves to have evolved with so many other species would make ethics 
more inclusive. Nevertheless, impressed with the power of mind over mat-
ter, the Cartesian legacy continues that nature is value-free. 
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In an age of naturalism, philosophers seem as yet unable to natural-
ize values. They are naturalizing ethics and metaphysics. They have 
connected human ethical behavior to Darwinian reciprocity, kin selection, 
genetic fitness, and so on. In epistemology, philosophers notice how our 
human perceptions have an evolutionary history. Our cognitive capacities 
are pragmatic ways of functioning in the world. They interpret ideologies 
and metaphysical views as means of coping, worldviews that enable 
humans in their societies to cohere and to outcompete other societies. 
Philosophers (as we have heard) insist that we remain embodied and real-
ize how our mind has its roots in matter. 
But philosophers are slow to naturalize axiology. If they do, they try 
to demonstrate the biological roots of human values. Joining the evolu-
tionary psychologists, they show that our values root in our biological 
needs—for food, shelter, security, resources, self-defense, offspring, stabil-
ity and status in our societies. Beyond that, philosophers are reluctant to 
naturalize values in any deeper sense. They cannot disconnect nature from 
humans so that anything else in nature can have any intrinsic value on its 
own. Nature comes to have value only when humans take it up into their 
experience. Humans en-act value. 
That is disconcerting. There is something philosophically naive, and 
even hazardous in a time of ecological crisis, about living in a reference 
frame where one species takes itself as central and values every thing else 
in nature relative to its potential to produce value for itself. One might 
think that embodied human valuers, with such smart minds, would be 
quick to see that other embodied beings, nonhumans, have their values 
too. Intrinsic values skin-in would enable us to locate values out there, 
outside our skins and inside other skins. Value, first self-experienced in 
our own kind and communities, could metaphorically extend to others 
and their kinds, immediately to other psychological selves and further to 
other somatic selves, in their species lines and ecosystemic communities. 
Somewhat curiously, however, the more obvious kind of naturaliz-
ing—showing that our values are framed by our evolutionary 
embodiment in the world—blinds us to the deeper kind of naturalizing— 
recognizing an evolutionary world in which values, some of which we 
share, are pervasively embodied in the nonhuman world. We are unable 
to discover value except in ourselves and our own kind. Our "enlight-
ened" ("Enlightenment") axiology has blinded us to a world laden with 
values. Here the can't-get-out-of-our-skin epistemology can be as much 
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problem as answer. We are powerless to act verifying even facts, much less 
values outside human realms. 
In the ultra-sophisticated circles of postmodern epistemology, if 
describing nature is an illusion, finding intrinsic values present in nature 
is still more illusion. Do not try, warns Eugene Hargrove, to develop a 
nonhumanist argument that "such values exist independently in 
nature ... The best way ... to deal with this concern is actively to defend 
these values as part of our cultural heritage, not to try to develop a meta- 
physical/epistemological theory of objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic 
values that constitutively trumps individual judgment and culturally 
evolved values" (1992, 186). Be an activist; defend the wolves in Yellow-
stone as part of your American heritage—the wild West. Do not think you 
are epistemologically competent to know the ontology or axiology of 
wolves. 
The retreat into our cultural heritage is wise, it is insisted, because 
knowing nonanthropogenic intrinsic value requires humans to do what 
they cannot, get out of their skins, languages, minds, and to value nature 
independently of human perceptions and preferences. Hargrove contin-
ues: "The search for a nonanthropocentric intrinsic value seems to me to 
be comparable to a Kantian search for actual objects in the noumenal 
world. To succeed, the nonanthropocentrists apparently need to go 
beyond valuing based on the human perspective—which seems impossi-
ble" (1992, 192). 
Is it so impossible? Will not actual objects in the phenomenal world 
serve to take us beyond the values we have culturally selected? Any val-
ues intrinsic to the wolves are humanly extra-somatic, though these are 
not dis-embodied values. They are in wolf bodies. We can judge them by 
comparison with our own somatic interests. Yes, comes the reply, but that 
is just the point. The shapes these phenomenal values take reflect our con-
stituting framework. All these values come through with a human face; 
they have to be enjoyed by flesh-and-blood humans in their cultural 
places. So we are warned: Do not try to go beyond and mistakenly think 
that you know anything objective about either nature or values there. 
Bernard Williams insists: "A concern for nonhuman animals is indeed 
a proper part of human life, but we can acquire it, cultivate it, and teach 
it only in terms of our understanding of ourselves" (1985,118). Well, yes 
and no. The concern has to be ours, and our relation to animals will affect 
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our self understanding, especially with pets and domestic animals. But we 
also need to understand animals in their wild, noncultural settings. Envi-
ronmental ethics is not ethics by extension, not just humane moralism 
toward our cousins in fur and feathers. 
We treat humans and wild animals differently, for instance, non-inter-
fering in the pain of wild animals in distress, letting nature take its course, 
letting the wolves eat the elk, which would be monstrously cruel should 
we let wolves eat humans this way. "Our ethical relations to each other 
must always be different from our relations to other animals" (Williams 
1985, 118). But just such valuing requires extra-cultural objectivity, a 
window outside our self-understanding. They live in wild nature, we live 
in culture superimposed on nature. We do not want to see in the wolves 
a human face. 
Nor is it just the beasts with whom we have such ties. We share vital-
ity with the invertebrates, the protozoans, the plants. Plants are not only 
nonhuman; they are faceless, as are protozoans and many invertebrates. 
Surely it is a mistake to see them with a human face, although their organ- 
ismic value is, as much as is ours, embodied value. But it is value 
embodied quite differently. 
To fall back into conserving nature as, and only as, important in "our 
cultural heritage" is to slip into another of these anthropocentric illusions 
that have long plagued philosophy, the mind turned in on itself in a 
self-reflexive trap, unable to test either its facts or its values against 
an external world. The objectivity myth, so alleged, is replaced by a 
subjectivity myth. Nature may not be as given as the naive realists 
suppose; but, upon finding this out, we make an equally naive mistake 
to think that actual nature is not given at all. 
Bryan Norton chooses, admirably, to place his memorable encounter 
with a little girl collecting sand dollars on a Florida beach as an introduc-
tion to his Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (1991), and the sand 
dollar is featured on the book jacket. I share Norton's hope that she can 
find better ways of valuing sand dollars than to toss them into chlorox to 
kill and bleach them, and then sell them for a nickel each to make orna-
ments. But when he tries to give a rationale, to imagine what might be 
said to such a utilitarian mentality, he finds himself stuttering, unable to 
escape his "environmentalists' dilemma" (1991, 3-12). 
Norton insists, right through to the end of his book: "Moralists 
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among environmental ethicists have erred in looking for a value in living 
things that is independent of human valuing. They have therefore forgot-
ten a most elementary point about valuing anything. Valuing always 
occurs from the viewpoint of a conscious valuer. ... Only the humans are 
valuing agents" (1991, 251). That nowhere leaves him well-placed to 
value sand dollars. Such value epistemology does, indeed, put him in a 
dilemma. 
What he himself clearly feels "is this sense of respect for sand dollars 
as living creatures" (1991, 5), for value present there that ought not to be 
sacrificed for a nickel. Something "matters" to the sand dollars; that's 
what's the matter with killing them so trivially. But he cannot voice this 
reason, and this is not surprising since, epistemologically, he does not 
think that language serves well to represent anything objective at any 
range of observation (1992, 218), and therefore is unable, ontologically, 
to re-present, to present to us any values objectively present in lives out 
there. If Norton does not have any reliable truth about what those sand 
dollars are in themselves, either in terms of their biology or of values 
intrinsically present there, then there is not much argument possible with 
those who prefer dollars to sand dollars. 
He says: They are alive and I interact with them with "character- 
building transformative value" (1987, 10-11). He gets an enlarged sense 
of his place in the world. She says: They are alive, but I interact to trans-
form them into dried shells for ornaments my mother makes, and I value 
them for that. So it is just one person's interactive experience against 
another person's, and no one can appeal to a better appreciation of what 
is actually there. His interactive acts lead to one set of facts. Her interac-
tive acts lead to another. Different spokes for different folks. 
Those who can appeal only to their interactive experiences with 
nature, or to those that their cultures have preferred to choose, uncon-
vinced that they or anybody else can go further, really do not have any 
convincing arguments with those who choose otherwise. They are des-
tined to end, as Norton ended his conversation on the beach, "in 
ideological impasse," in a "dilemma in values." This dilemma with sand 
dollars, he muses, is a microcosm of the human relation to the whole bios-
phere (1991, 3-13). Norton hit reality when he encountered the sand 
dollars, and lamented the little girl making a resource of them; he has yet 
to face up to the epistemic crisis that contact with sand dollars entails. 
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The social construction that dresses up nature most unrealistically is 
that nature is all and only resource-for-us-humans, that there is no value 
there unless and until we conjure up value. That we enact and project all 
value, a metaphysics buttressed supposedly by an embodied epistemology 
confining us to our own experiences, that all value has a human face— 
that is surely Cartesian myth, a misleading webwork of belief if ever there 
was one. Natural science is superb evidence of our capacities to discover 
facts outside our own home range. What a pity that such creative genius, 
looking at the planet as a whole (as from space), can then shrink down to 
a "can't get out of my skin" argument, or to a "no values without a 
human valuer" account. What's inside my skin is itself quite good evi-
dence for evolutionary achievements out there; my valuing and valuable 
mind is even better evidence for the surprising powers of evolutionary 
creativity. 
More recently, Norton "values nature for the creativity of its 
processes." "It is possible to recognize a deeper source of value in nature, 
what might be called 'nature's creativity'" (2000, 1029, 1039), Amen! 
Now there is prospect of real progress! Here we reach the final of our c- 
words: construction, contamination, clarification, constraint,, and now, 
creativity. To avoid further dilemma, however, first we will have to figure 
out how we know enough about these creative processes to evaluate 
them. Will we not need considerable realism, accurate if not objective? We 
can learn to respect the sand dollar as a product of this creative process, 
perhaps even to find value achieved and located there. 
Once we ascertain creativity put there, as ontological process, we will 
need to return within if we are to take this creativity seriously. These 
processes created not only the sand dollar but also the mind and hand, 
supreme and superb evolutionary achievements. We have to take that 
human genius seriously in its creativity, "Celebrate nature's infinite cre-
ativity," urges Norton (2000, cf. 1043). Yes, and certainly we must see our 
brains as dynamic and creative objects, bodily as these are, and sponsor-
ing our subjective minds, valuable, able-to-value. Humans are as infinitely 
creative as anything else yet achieved in evolutionary history, with our 
1012 neurons, each capable of 103 interconnections, quite dynamic and 
with more brain circuits possible than there are atoms in the universe. 
Hence I have no wish to oppose the idea that humans construct and 
critique their myriad concepts, enabling them to amplify, focus, correct, 
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and extend their percepts. Rather, I rejoice in this continuing creativity. 
There is active nature actively known by human genius. Moral agents are 
not found outside society; but it does not follow that morality, arising 
within society, cannot find value in the natural world, resulting from cre-
ativity there and in encounter with which duties arise. This finding of 
value is going to have to be intellectually credible before it can be morally 
imperative. The sole moral species thereby comes to care for Earth, These 
facts result from and further command our acts. Finding ourselves living 
in that kind of place is quite exciting. We might become Homo sapiens. 
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